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Reinstalling the Spanish Component
THE JOURNALS OF DON DIEGO DE VARGAS, NEW MEXICO,
16 9 1- 1 7°4

John L. Kessell

C

ould he trust them? Characteristically, he was laying himself open, taking a grave but calculated risk. Amid some one hundred and fifty allied

Pueblo Indians marching behind Gov. Diego de Vargas and dozens of armed
Spaniards came a sullen contingent ofJemez fighting men he had vanquished
in battle not six weeks before. Yet on this day, Vargas needed every man. He had
struck a deal with these Jemez. He would free more than three hundred of
their women and children held hostage in Santa Fe if the men would join
him in a final assault on defiant Tewas and Tanos fortified atop Black Mesa.
All previous efforts had failed. This time, however, beating back parties of
enemy skirmishers and threatening to denude their planted fields below the
mesa, the Spanish governor prevailed. Tewa and Tano spokesmen, after negotiating a schedule and exchanging gifts, pledged that the people would

Professor Emeritus of History at the University of New Mexico, John L. Kessell is founding
editor of the Vargas Project. His most recent book is Spain in the Southwest: A Narrative His-

tory of New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, and California (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
2002, ISBN 0-8061-34°7-0). He would like to thank his colleagues on the Vargas Project at the
University of New Mexico, especially Rick Hendricks, as well as Larry D. Miller and Meredith
D. Dodge, for their valuable suggestions in revising this essay. This piece will appear, in essentially this form, as the afterword to the sixth and final volume of the Vargas Series: John L.
Kessell, Rick Hendricks, Meredith D. Dodge, and Larry D. Miller, eds., A Settling ofAccounts:
The Journals ofdon Diego de Vargas, New Mexico, 17°0-17°4 (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2002).
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come down peaceably and reoccupy their pueblos. Two days later in Santa
Fe, true to his word, Vargas released the Jemez women and children.
Above all, he was a risk taker, which explained in large part how he waged
war and peace. Deep-seated character traits-arrogance, valor, dogged determination, and devotion to honor-governed the career of Diego de Vargas,
working often to his advantage but finally against him. As reconqueror of
New Mexico during the 169os, Vargas not only presided over the third and
final phase of the Pueblo-Spanish War begun in 1680, but also lent his name
to an era. For much of this time, officials in Mexico City and Madrid rightly
considered New Mexico a war zone and debated the level of military spending. Meanwhile, colonist families, Spanish officers and men-at-arms, Franciscan friars, Pueblo Indians who sided with them, and Pueblo Indians who
fought tenaciously against them lived a day-at-a-time existence and shifted to
survive. By the end ofVargas's abbreviated second term, for better or for worse,
the colony had been restored to the Spanish empire.
Son of a middling and financially encumbered nobleman of Madrid, don
Diego grew up in Spain with the amenities of his class and a large extended
family. His mother died when he was five, and his father, Capt. Alonso de Vargas Zapata, a year later took an overseas assignment in Guatemala, where he
eventually remarried. Young Vargas never saw him again. Evidently because
of a congenital speech defect, the boy did not follow his father as a menina,
or noble page in the royal household. Instead, when he had acquired requisite age and skill, he enrolled in the palace guard. In 1664, then twenty, he
married Beatriz Pimentel de Prado, whom he had known since childhood.
With the death of his older brother in Spain and his father in Guatemala, don
Diego assumed responsibility for the debts and maintenance of the Vargas
estate, a role that gave him no pleasure. Beatriz, during the first six years of
their marriage, bore him five children, one of whom died in infancy. Then
in 1670, resolved to end the family's long tradition of indebtedness and secure
a share of his father's New World legacy, Diego de Vargas, citing the notable
services of his father and grandfather, petitioned the crown for an appointment in the Spanish Indies. He sailed in 1672.
Finding favor at the viceregal court of the Conde de Paredes in Mexico
City, don Diego won appointments successively as alcalde mayor of Teutila
in Oaxaca and Tlalpujahua in Michoacan, while keeping a residence and
friends in the capital. Vargas's heroics in both outlying posts, especially his
economic revitalization of the Tlalpujahua mining district, earned him high
marks as an administrator. Shortly after receiving the sad word that Beatriz had
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DIEGO DE VARGAS, THE ONLY KNOWN PORTRAIT, IN THE CAPILLA DE SAN
ISIDRO, MADRID, SPAIN.

(Photo courtesy Palace of the Governors, Santa Fe, New Mexico, neg. no. 11409.)
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died in Spain, the young widower found a companion. Her name may have
been Nicolasa Rincon. He did not marry her. Nor, evidently, did he pursue
other women. Between 1679 and 1686, the couple produced two natural sons
and a daughter. Through an agent at court in Madrid, Diego de Vargas contributed twenty-five hundred pesos and received royal title to the low-ranking governorship of New Mexico, a remote colony in exile. Fortuitously, the
new viceroy, another able madrileno, took don Diego's part at every turn.
From the day of his accession at brutish El Paso, Vargas k~ew there would be
no restoration of New Mexico without the patronage ofthe Conde de Calve. 1

(1688-1696).
(From Manuel Rivera Cambas, Los gobernantes de Mexico [Mexico City:
Imprenta de f. M. Aguilar Ortiz, 1872],265.)
VICEROY THE CONDE DE CALVE
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Loss of the kingdom and provinces of New Mexico dated from 1680, when
fifteen to twenty thousand Pueblo Indians, all but united, had struck and
killed or expelled twenty-five hundred Spanish colonists. The affront cried
out for vengeance. Calve made restoration of New Mexico a matter of first
order. Native peoples in silver-rich Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora had also risen,
emboldened by the Spaniards' seeming inability to humble the Pueblos.
Equally apparent in terms of imperial rivalry was the French threat of invasion from the east following the Sieur de La Salle's landing on the Texas coast
in the mid-168os. Religion gave further cause. Thousands of Pueblo Indian
souls, apostates from Spanish Catholicism, must be absolved and reconciled.
Hence-even in the shadow of Carlos II's uncertain reign and European
wars, rapacious pirates in the Caribbean, and riots 'in Mexico City-the recolonization of New Mexico stood out Z
From the moment of his accession, Vargas's challenge was evident. How,
given the paltry human and physical resources of this exiled colony, could he
effect the triumphant reconquest he envisioned? Enduring the tribulations
of his first eighteen months in office, a resolute don Diego pleaded again and
again for aid from Viceroy Calve. His armed reconnaissance without women
and children late in 1692, and the Pueblo Indians' assent to ritual repossession, convinced Vargas that these erstwhile rebels would accept restoration
ofthe Spanish colony peaceably. In Mexico City, Calve and his court toasted
a fait accompli. Don Diego bid for early promotion. But all were deceived,
especially the hundreds of colonists who joined their governor on the tardy
recolonizing expedition of 1693. Admonishing them to look beyond immediate hardship and any fear of Pueblo Indian opposition, he anticipated resettling New Mexico with plow, seed, and livestock. Forced instead to fight
in the snow for Santa Fe, certain of the colonists came to despise the strutting
Diego de Vargas.
The future looked bleak. Hardly any of the Spanish men, women, and
children crowding into Santa Fe's close quarters the last two days of 1693 had
bargained for what lay ahead. The viciousness of the reconquest - of handto-hand combat, executions, dismemberment, theft of livestock and stored
maize, destruction of crops in the field, and hostage-taking - rose as a crescendo from the battle for Santa Fe in 1693, through the assaults of 1694, to
the uprising of 1696 and its bloody aftermath. l This was no black-and-white
struggle between cruel Spanish invaders and noble Pueblo resistors. Both
peoples were deeply rent by the experience.
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Pueblo Indians, never able to regain the near unity of 1680, fought and
died on both sides of every major encounter. Factionalism among the Pueblos, when related by Spaniards, regularly came down Eurocentrically to one
question: Are they for us or against us, our king, and our Catholic faith? On
occasion, Spanish documents picked up dissenting Pueblo voices, but always
transmitted in non-Pueblo terms. The Christian God, in one instance, had
enlightened certain members of the outlying and resistant Zuni nation to
preserve images of Jesus Christ. Whatever power such effigies possessed for
the individuals who secreted them, Spaniards were loath to believe that the
Indians' action might have resulted not from veneration but from internal
dissension among Zunis. Pueblo peoples had reasons enough of their own to
accept or oppose returning Spaniards, that is, to use them or items of their
material culture in one way or another. Pueblo animosities and loyaltiespersonal or kinship affairs; maintenance of territorial, occupational, or trade
boundaries; disputes over sacred or profane leadership-such motivations
gave Pueblos ample justification to ally themselves with or contest a renewed
Hispanic presence.
Whatever their reasons, Pueblos defied Pueblos, splitting not only closebuilt individual communities like Pecos and Taos, but also language groups.
That Keresan-speaking Zia, Santa Ana, and San Felipe, brutalized during
two previous Spanish entradas, sided irrevocably with Spaniards under Vargas (while their linguistic kin of Cochiti and Santo Domingo vacillated between fight and flight) likely owed less to intimidation than to the prospect of
enlisting Spanish allies against their long-time, encroaching Towa neighbors
ofthe Jemez pueblos. On this occasion, moreover, there reappeared a leader
of commanding presence.
Bartolome de Ojeda, an indio ladino literate in Spanish but also a Keres
war captain, had fought the Spaniards at Zia in 1689, suffering nasty wounds,
capture, and abduction. Recovering from the trauma, he had lived three years
among Hispanic refugees in the EI Paso district. There, Ojeda made up his
mind, for reasons he did not share, to rally certain of his own people to the
Spanish side, perhaps to spare them during the inevitable recolonization.
Without Ojeda, Domingo of Tesuque, Juan de Ye of Pecos-all of whom, in
Roman Catholic terms, Vargas embraced as compadres-and others like them
who interpreted, negotiated, and recruited Pueblo allies, the disruption might
have lasted years longer.
At the same time, other Pueblo principal men fought valiantly against
Spanish reoccupation, earning both Vargas's grudging admiration and his
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A ZUNI MAN, PHOTOGRAPH BY EDWARD S. CURTIS, 1903.

(Photograph courtesy Palace of the Governors, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
neg. no. 143712.)

enmity. Cacique Diego Umviro of Pecos thought of Spaniards as a different
species and justified killing them if they again invaded the Pueblos' world.
As in 1680, Vargas's men-at-arms recognized mixed-blood leaders among their
Pueblo antagonists. OfIndian and mulatto descent, Lucas Naranjo, a Santa
Clara war captain, seeking to put himself at the head of a purge of Spaniards
in 1696, died instead when a soldier's musket ball struck him in the Adam's
apple and came out the nape of his neck.
While the Spanish recolonizers, united by the task of restoring a common
sovereignty, might have appeared almost monolithic, no level of their soci-
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ety was exempt from dispute. At the top, two contending peninsular Spaniards set a poor example. 4 Considering himself a proprietary conqueror, Vargas doggedly refused to accept the end of a governor's standard five-year term
without promotion or reappointment. That put him and his legally appointed
successor at dagger points in 1697. Although socially inferior, Pedro Rodriguez Cubero, newly wielding the authority of the office, refused to abide don
Diego's obstructions. He brought suit and imprisoned him. Colonists by the
dozens, eager to vent their spleen or ingratiate themselves with Rodriguez
Cubero, rendered a litany of malfeasance, immorality, and financial irregularities against Vargas and his inner circle. Otliers professed their loyalty. The
internecine legal wrangling cost don Diego six years and heavy expense before he at last gained reappointment in 1703, only to die in office the following year. Still, through it all, the Hispanic polity of distant New Mexico held
together, attesting to the maturity of the colonial system.
Not only did the Vargas era demonstrate the resilience of a governorship in
contention, but also the full range of Spanish royal justice that bound a far-off
colony to the empire. From the governor's appointed alcaldes mayores in every district of New Mexico and the Santa Fe cabildo, or town council, on up
to the Audiencia of Mexico City and the Council of the Indies in Madrid, a
citizen had recourse, at least in theory. Even during Vargas's rule, which critics considered despotic, colonists through the cabildo in 1696 and 1697 won a
new viceroy's approval to send Capt. Lazaro de Mizquia to Mexico City with
their suggestions for better government. Yet at every level, favoritism, whom
one knew or had influence with, weighed heavily. It is doubtful that viceregal
authorities would have considered such complaints against Vargas during the
administration of the Conde de Calve, don Diego's friend and sponsor.
In the New Mexico colony, privileged members of Vargas's staff, several
of whom he brought with him from Mexico City or Tlalpujahua, responded
in their own ways to the dangers and opportunities of the recolonization. 5
Their behavior ranged from the unquestioned fealty of Juan Paez Hurtado
to the opportunism of Antonio de Valverde Cosio. Unlucky Alfonso Rael de
Aguilar, veteran secretary of government and war, and a family man with
pregnant wife and six children, found himself caught in the crossfire between
Vargas and Rodriguez Cubero. Despite scurrilous threats by the former governor's partisans, Rael eventually confessed to spying for don Diego. Most of
these ranking retainers, younger than their patron, stayed on with their families after his death, competing for power and prestige and ending their lives
in the restored colony.
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Relatively few in number, the Franciscans exercised a spiritual and sacramental monopoly in restoration New Mexico, as they had since the colony's
founding. Both remoteness and tradition contributed to this unusual situation. Faithful Roman Catholics throughout most of the Spanish Indies could
resort not only to members of more than one religious order, to Jesuits, Dominicans, and others, but also to the diocesan clergy. In New Mexico, however, Franciscans ministered to everyone. Colonists alienated the friars at
their own risk. For pastoral care, baptisms, marriages, and burial of their infants or parents, they had no other choice. After Diego de Vargas had resolved
in his favor a dispute over church property in the El Paso district, the governor got on well enough with most of the Franciscans. He reinstalled the bluerobed friars at Pueblo Indian missions as circumstances permitted. He relied
on them as military chaplains, and certain of them sided openly with him
against Rodriguez Cubero.
It was, however, the hundreds of colonists themselves who-along with
the Pueblo Indians-determined the outcome ofthe Vargas era. Four distinct
groups of culturally Hispanic settlers made their toilsome way up the Rio
Grande Valley in the 1690s.
The refugees-native New Mexican men and women who had lived
through the revolt of 1680 and the children born to them during the colony's
exile-were coming home. Most, having endured a dozen years of hand-tomouth existence in the several El Paso settlements, were impoverished. On
a muster roll, Governor Vargas noted the case of veteran Sgto. Mayor Sebastian Gonzalez, whose household numbered fourteen but who claimed to
own not even a shirt. Although they accepted similar incentives ofland and
status, these survivors resented the newer recruits. No one who had not shared
the experience could ever understand the depths of their suffering. As reminders, too, these New Mexicans had among them several dozen former
captives ransomed during Vargas's reconnaissance of 1692, most of them children who had grown up with the Pueblos since 1680 and knew them intimately.
A second contingent, rugged young men, some with families, Vargas had
recruited in 1693 from the mining districts of northern New Spain to serve in
the presidio of restored Santa Fe. On occasion, he referred to them loosely
as the one hundred Spanish soldiers. These two bands - returning New Mexicans and military recruits, numbering altogether eight or nine hundred
souls-appeared first in Governor Vargas's train late in 1693 and fought in
winter for Santa Fe.
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Another 220 or 230 persons, sixty-odd families who considered themselves
better than the other colonists, composed the third group. Enlisted with considerable fanfare in and around Mexico City, these self-proclaimed espanoles
mexicanos, many of them artisans, reached New Mexico in June 1694 and,
after a miserable, crowded winter in Santa Fe, found themselves transplanted
to Villa Nueva de Santa Cruz de la Canada. Predominantly urban dwellers,
few had experience farming or raising stock. 6
Finally came a mixed company of about 145 individuals gathered in Zacatecas, Sombrerete, and vicinity in 1694 and 1695 by Juan Paez Hurtado:
men, women, and children, some legitimate families and others pushed together fraudulently so Paez could collect more in government subsidies.?
Throughout Vargas's remaining years and long thereafter, these four groups,
socializing and often marrying within, appear to have maintained separate
identities and not always harmonious relations. s
A rough and resilient militia captain who lived to be eighty exemplified
the disapproving returnees. Francisco de Anaya Almazan II, born in New
Mexico about 1633 and widowed after 1663, had then married a sister of his
brother's wife, but lost her, his children, and all his possessions in the uprising of 1680. He persevered during the El Paso years, married a third wife,
and joined the restoration. Picking up practically where he left off, Sargento Mayor Anaya Almazan served again as alcalde mayor in the Galisteo
district and as an officer of the colony's Confraternity of La Conquistadora.
He received a modest land grant from Governor Vargas and bought a house
in Santa Fe. Don Diego relied on Anaya and fellow returnees like Roque
Madrid and Juan Ruiz de Caceres who knew Pueblo languages. At times,
Vargas and subsequent governors heeded the counsel of these experienced
New Mexicans and, at others, they pointedly ignored them. Regardless,
Anaya, born and bred in the colony, personified a continuity that bridged
the entire, continuous, three-act Pueblo-Spanish War, from 1680 through
16 9 69
Ofthe military recruits, none was more ambitious or successful than Antonio de Valverde CosIo, a peninsular Spaniard from Santander who had cast
his lot with Vargas at Sombrerete in 1693. He soon became the governor's
favorite, accused by detractors of sharing all don Diego's excesses. Valverde's
ascent from adjutant to economic, political, and social overlord of the El Paso
district had no precedent in the colony. Parleying his entree into an influential, transatlantic association of men from Santander and a trip to Spain as
don Diego's agent in the late 1690s, don Antonio became captain-for-life of

SUMMER 2002

KESSELL

+ 305

the El Paso presidio and the area's alcalde mayor. His diversified farming,
livestock, and brandy- and wine-producing property known as San Antonio
de Padua-truly a hacienda-operated on a scale unknown in the extreme
north. Largely because of the entrepreneurship ofValverde and his extended
family, El Paso proved more viable economically during the first half of the
eighteenth century than any of the upriver villas of Santa Fe, Santa Cruz de
la Canada, and after 1706 Albuquerque. When he died in 1728, having served
as governor of New Mexico between 1717 and 1722, Antonio de Valverde left
an estate worth tens of thousands of pesos lO
On up the Rio Grande Valley, Hispanic mechanical and popular arts took
new and lasting root with the transplanted artisans dispatched from the viceregal capital under Capt. Cristobal Velasco and fray Francisco Farfan in 1693.
Even as they learned to farm, they did not abandon their trades. Along with
blacksmiths, cartwrights, cobblers, masons, millers, tailors, and weavers came
a filigree maker, coppersmith, sculptor, musician, and two painters. The only
chandler listed, Juan de Gongora, had died before the company's departure
from Mexico City. His widow, however, Petronila de la Cueva y Almonacid,
then thirty-seven, along with two sons and three daughters, relocated without him. Of medium build with aquiline face, large eyes, and the scar of an
old wound on her left cheek, she soon met Juan de Chaves Medina of Zacatecas in the close quarters of Santa Fe. Uncharacteristically, she remarried
outside the group of espanoles mexicanos and remained with her children
and new husband in Santa Fe. Twenty years later, neighbors accused her of
malicious gossipY
The last ofVargas's four imports of settlers materialized in 1695 and buoyed
the restoration to a degree. Resourcefully recruited in northern New Spain
by Juan Paez Hurtado, they came on the scene after the fierce campaigns of
1694 but before the Pueblo uprising of 1696. Robust, thirty-year-old Francisco
Montes Vigil, with curly chestnut hair and a scar under his left eye, and his
wife Marfa Jimenez de Enciso, both natives of Zacatecas and considered
espanoles, had gone to sign up with their five children and a free mulatto servant. Instead of appearing on the muster roll as one large family unit of eight
persons entitled to the maximum family subsidy of 320 pesos, Paez had them
distributed among three units, evidently so that he and they might collect
more. The list showed Francisco and Marfa with two children, a fictitious
uncle with their other three, and the mulatto as part of a third unit. These
paper families, meant to hoodwink royal officials in Zacatecas, may not have
dictated how the company traveled to New Mexico.
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RAFAEL GARCIA, BORN IN BELEN, NEW MEXICO, ON 2 MAY

18°4,

GREAT-

GREAT-GRANDSON OF RAMON GARCIA JURADO, WHO ARRIVED IN SANTA FE

1694.
(Photograph property of author, courtesy James, Estevan, and Dominic Garcia,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.)
AS A TEENAGED COLONIST IN
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Later, in 1697 and 1698, during RodrIguez Cubero's denunciations ofVargas and Paez Hurtado, Francisco Montes Vigil testified that he had aided in
the deception. He and another recruit frequented gambling houses in Zacatecas, picking up vagabonds and taking them to the treasury office to enlist
for New Mexico under made-up names. For each, Paez allegedly received
pesos, paid the man off with 4 to 6 pesos, discharged him, and kept the
balance. Several dozen people on the list never left Zacatecas. Such accusations seem to have been true, at least partially, although no record of a conviction has come to light. 12

100

It hardly mattered. Regardless of how or in which of the four immigrant
parties they had come to the colony, and regardless of how long they adhered
socially, most of the twelve or thirteen hundred Hispanic men, women, and
children put down roots, had babies, and became New Mexicans. Together,
by their expanding presence, they reinstalled the Spanish component in New
Mexico's evolving cultural universe.
On the surface, little had changed. Restoration New Mexico looked very
much like the prewar colony. The Vargas era had introduced few evident
new technologies. No innovative tool, item of horse gear, or weapon changed
how jobs got done. No flood of currency altered the largely barter and credit
economy. People dressed and furnished their homes similarly, ate the same
foods, and passed a normal day in familiar pursuits, mostly farming, tending
livestock, and raising families. Daily dealings between Hispanic settlers and
Pueblo Indians-for purposes of exchange, service, and social contact, both
forced and consensual- resumed almost as soon as the fighting ceased. And
as in the previous century, the two neighboring peoples coexisted pragmatically, giving and taking articles of material culture, useful customs, nouns
from their languages, and blood through ethnic crossbreeding, all the while
heedfully maintaining the lines of their parallel societies.

It is too simple to say that lessons of the Pueblo-Spanish War, which resulted as much from the environmental crises of the 1670S as from colonial
oppression, taught the two peoples to make common cause. Other forces,
external and internal, offer better explanations. Heightened pressure from
surrounding nonsedentary nations compelled Pueblo and Hispanic agriculturalists to join in their mutual defense, especially after the 1720S when
Comanches added themselves to the prewar array ofApaches, Navajos, and
Utes. Demography, too, corrected an old imbalance. Before the war, Hispanic colonists survived as a nervous and high-handed minority. After the
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restoration, their numbers grew steadily, reaching parity around 1750 with
a diminished but stable Pueblo population-at about ten thousand each.
Whether a pervasive new respect, engendered by the war years, grew between
peoples culturally Pueblo and Hispanic is debatable.
In contrast to many areas of colonial Latin America, New Mexico did not
produce a new race born of Spaniards and Indians, even though the two peoples coincided as near neighbors in the Rio Grande Valley. The colony, however, lacked an exploitable natural resource. Hence, despite its relatively large
sedentary population of Pueblo Indians, there was little to attract non-Indian
immigrants or to set Indians at mining, gathering, or growing. Except for a
few families, Hispanic and Pueblo New Mexicans were poor. Neither group
had reason to envy or want to be part of the other. Few Spaniards, and fewer
Franciscans, learned any of the half-dozen Pueblo languages, which, more
than any other circumstance, left the Indians free to preserve their culture.
So, as the two peoples worked out their modus vivendi, each allowed the
cultural identity of the other.
From a historical perspective, the Pueblo-Spanish War and Vargas era most
assuredly thrust up a watershed between the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colonies. Even though the government, religious life, and defense of resource-poor New Mexico continued to run on subsidies from the royal treasury,
Spain's fundamental justification for providing them shifted. Defense of empire replaced evangelism. For most of the earlier century, missionary rationale
subsumed the territorial imperative, and Spanish kings kept funding the Franciscans' city of God on the Rio Grande until the Pueblos tore it down in 1680.
And while the restored friars still depended on their government stipends,
military spending on New Mexico increased dramatically after 1700 as Spain
fought to hold western North America against a rising tide of adversaries.
Much else changed in New Mexico, almostimperceptibly. For one thing,
the eighteenth-century colony was decidedly more secular. The Franciscans
never regained after 1680 the sway they exercised before. No longer did they
wield the authority of the Holy Office of the Inquisition so indisputably. Most
New Mexicans still had spiritual recourse only to the friars, but a few diocesan
priests took up residence first in the EI Paso area, then in Santa Fe, and three
bishops of Durango carried out visitations of New Mexico in the eighteenth
centuryY Economically, too, the friars lost ground. Before the war, they had
controlled the colony's principal supply service, while the combined wealth
of their mission lands, labor force, and flocks always overshadowed that of the
secular community. Neither circumstance survived.
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Encomiendas, grants to Spaniards of Indian tribute, which operated to
sustain a corps of armed Spanish captains in the prewar colony, were not
reinstated. Governor Vargas's eleventh-hour award, in effect a government
annuity, implied no burden on the Indians of New Mexico. Paid officers and
soldiers of the Santa Fe and EI Paso presidios took the place of encomenderos
in rallying able members of New Mexico's citizen militia and the Pueblo
auxiliary fighting men who regularly outnumbered them.
Diego de Vargas had a vision, and to that end, against all odds, he bent his
will. Encouraged by Viceroy Galve, Vargas proposed to transplant to New
Mexico a reliable, sturdy class of settlers recruited in the heartland of New
Spain. Responding to incentives ofland, status, and a new start, these people,
Governor Vargas believed, would willingly become small landholders in the
reestablished colony. Presidios at EI Paso and Santa Fe would protect this
civilian base population. Don Diego wanted at least five hundred such colonist families, some two or three thousand men, women, and children, as well
as enough government funding to settle them permanently in New Mexico's
hostile environment.
When far fewer families volunteered and expenses soared, Vargas watched
his carefully conceived program founder. He felt betrayed. Economy-minded
bureaucrats in Mexico City seemed bent on compromising his plan as originally conceived and approved. His demands of the viceregal government
grew more strident. Only when the heartland of New Spain dried up as a
source did he send Paez Hurtado recruiting in the mining districts of the near
north. Next, the Pueblo uprising of 1696 intervened. In 1697, with his project
still sadly deficient, don Diego bridled against the appearance ofa successor.
Rodriguez Cubero seemed not to care, and while their struggle further undermined the plan, Governor Vargas's vision had lasting effect.
Returning New Mexicans woke up to the changes reluctantly. They had
expected not only to reoccupy positions ofleadership in the restored colony,
but also to reclaim their families' prewar properties. Instead, they received
scant preferment from Governor Vargas. Members of his retinue, meanwhile,
wasted no time marrying daughters of old-line New Mexican families, adding social acceptance to their advantage as don Diego's favorites. More distressing to the returnees was the new governor's land policy. Vargas could not
regrant to surviving heirs the large estancias of the previous century and still
have sufficient productive land to distribute to the hundreds of new settlers
he continued to expect. Thus, as a result of his plan and the eventual growth
of the Hispanic population in a limited arable and pastoral landscape, the
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average farm and ranch in the postwar colony was smaller. By resisting the
claims of New Mexico's prewar elite, Vargas had assured a somewhat more
egalitarian eighteenth century. Difficult to discern at anyone moment, such
reforms put a new face on colonial New Mexico.
Although don Diego de Vargas died about five o'clock Tuesday afternoon, 8
April 1704, likely in Fernando Duran y Chaves's house at Bernalillo, the Vargas era lived on. His lieutenants provided political continuity. The governor's
office passed smoothly to Juan Paez Hurtado as acting governor in 1704 and
from him to the next man appointed from Mexico City. The process, in fact,
appeared to be operating more effectively on the periphery of empire than
in Spain itself where the War of the Spanish Succession had embroiled most
of Europe. In distant New Mexico, Vargas's people and policies prevailed.
Three of don Diego's retainers succeeded him as governor. Like their patron, all were Spanish-born. These peninsula res and their households, even
when not occupying the governor's palace, remained the cream of New Mexico's rude society, almost as if they had been blood relatives and heirs of the
Reconqueror. As mayordomos of the Conquistadora Confraternity, preferred
godparents, marriage sponsors, invited guests, and persons of influence, they
retained their class superiority, graciously or not. Two, Paez Hurtado (170417°5,1717) and Antonio de Valverde (1717-1722), committed early to the business of the colony, lived full lives, and died in New Mexico, the latter in EI
Paso in 1728, the former at Santa Fe in 1742. The third, Felix Martinez (17151717), a member of Vargas's officer corps and longtime captain of the Santa
Fe Presidio, did not consider himself aNew Mexican, returning several times
to Mexico City and dying there in 1731. Martinez and Valverde, never scrupling to profit from the governorship, recalled the Hapsburg mentality of
public office as commodity. Neither anticipated the dawning code of the
Bourbons, and both, as did Diego de Vargas, found themselves under investigation for malfeasance in office.
Military affairs proceeded as well with officers who had trained and fought
under Vargas. They commanded the presidios ofEI Paso and Santa Fe, maintained the order of drill, escort, and guard duty, and, up until the reforms of
Inspector Gen. Pedro de Rivera in the mid-1720S, manipulated presidial supply and payroll to their own benefit. When occasion demanded, they led columns in pur~uit of Apaches, Navajos, Comanches, and Frenchmen. Veteran
captains like Roque Madrid and Juan de Ulibarri further distinguished themselves. H At don Diego's side, they had shared the strategic advantage of cohorts
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of mixed Pueblo auxiliaries. They adhered, therefore, to his policies of requesting quotas of fighting men from individual pueblos based on population and
of sharing spoils in equal parts. Throughout the eighteenth century, campaign
rolls regularly revealed more Pueblo Indians than Hispanic men-at-arms.
Franciscans reinstalled in Pueblo communities by Governor Vargas kept on
ministering to their mission congregations and to an increasing number ofnonIndian families who lived nearby. Most adopted a more tolerant attitude than
their prewar brethren toward acts that appeared to their eyes as traditional Pueblo religious practice, so long as they did not interfere with the daily regimen
of Christian instruction, worship, and work. The crisis of 1696, during which
five friars had died violent deaths at the hands of Pueblo Indians, deeply impressed them. Passionately, as fears mounted, they had debated the nature of
martyrdom and what was worth dying for. To protect consecrated objects of
their faith from insolent, mocking unbelievers, or to teach the ultimate object
lesson of Christ's sacrifice,the majority agreed, were good reasons; to foolishly
go among threatening peoples was not. Fortunately for the missionaries in the
years after Vargas, death rarely loomed with such immediacy.
Experience elsewhere in New Spain had taught Diego de Vargas the efficacy of treating with Indians in a face-to-face, no-nonsense manner. He
embraced Indians physically and showed them respect. He stood as godfather
to the children of Pueblo leaders, which bound these principal men to him
as compadres, whatever this ritual may have meant to them. When circumstances permitted, Vargas negotiated in person. Parties who sat across from
him recognized in the Spanish governor a man of action, as quick to reward
as to punish. Whether his policies benefited or distressed them, don Diego
rarely failed to keep his word. Similar personal diplomacy permitted Antonio
de Valverde to avert a rebellion of Sumas in the vicinity of EI Paso between

1711 and 1713 and, much later, distinguished such governors as Tomas Velez
Cachupfn (1749-1754,1762-1767) and Juan Bautista de Anza (1778-1788).15
Vargas's cordiality with Pueblo leaders had worried covetous non-Indians.
In the minds of returning New Mexicans, it was bad enough that don Diego
had refused to regrant the large properties they had expected. Some in fact,
like the heirs of old Francisco de Anaya Almazan II, took their complaints to
subsequent governors and asked for additional acreage. 16 Worse in the long
run, because it effected many more colonists, was Vargas's evolving plan to
guarantee Pueblo Indian communities a fixed, measurable land base.
Long-established Pueblo towns already occupied in the 1690S twenty or
more sites with adjacent arable land along the Rio Grande and its tributaries
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north and south of Santa Fe. Although GovernorVargas seemed initially unsure of how much land the law provided for such native corporations, by 1704,
the year of his death, he evidently had decided. That year, to resolve a land
dispute between San Felipe Pueblo and colonists at La Angostura, Sec. Alfonso
Rael de Aguilar supervised the measurement for the Indians of the equivalent
of a league (about 2.6 miles) in each direction, or four square leagues, some

17,350 acres. The so-called Pueblo league, ignored or challenged ever since
by the Pueblos' non-Indian neighbors, remains to this day one of New Mexico's most contentious land issuesY
Few would deny the consequence of the Vargas era. Documents now available in The Journals ofdon Diego de Vargas suggest not only topics of research
that will bring into sharper focus this great divide in the colony's history, but
also currents of inquiry flowing back through the seventeenth century and
forward toward the present. The challenge is to embrace, own, and learn from
all ofthe past. A clearer understanding ofwho we are in New Mexico today depends on our response.
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Review Essay
RICHARD FLINT, GREAT CRUELTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED:

THE

1544 INVESTIGATION OF THE

CORONADO EXPEDITION

Donald Cutter

T

o Anglo readers Francisco Vazquez de Coronado is clearly one of the
best known Spanish conquistadores. Two prominent early historians have
written his story using existing documentation combined with earlier studies. From the biographies by A. Grove Day (1940), who gave up his interest in
the Southwest area and became the great storyteller of Hawaii, and Borderlands master Herbert E. Bolton (1949) we have had highly readable overviews
of the epic exploration. If they could have had the new documentary materials uncovered and published by Richard Flint, their stories of Coronado
would have been more complete, and they might have altered somewhat
their written versions of the great exploration. A significant contemporary
source strangely missing from both Flint's bibliography and comments is
George Parker Winship's translation of Pedro de Castaneda's eyewitness version of the Coronado story, first published in 1896.

Creat Cruelties Have Been Reported: The 1544 Investigation of the Coronado Expedition. By
Richard Flint. (Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 2002. xix + 647 pp. Halftones, appendixes, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. $45.00 cloth, ISBN 0-87°74-460-7.)
Donald C. Cutter is Professor Emeritus at the University of New Mexico. Among his most
recent publications are California in ]792: A Spanish Naval Visit, American Exploration and
Travel Series (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1995, ISBN 0-8061-2731-7) and with Iris Engstrand, Quest for Empire: Spanish Settlement in the Southwest (Golden, Colo.: Fulcrum Publishing Company, 1996, ISBN ]-55591-23°-3.)
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Whereas Bolton, Day, and Winship lauded the achievements of Coronado, as he has been called north of the international border that separates
our Spanish Southwest from Mexico's Frontera Nortefia, Flint casts Vazquez
de Coronado in a considerably lesser light. In a series of chapters the story unfolds slowly, revealing the hidden documents that provide an ex-past-facto
account geared either to cast blame upon the leader or to exonerate him. To
this end a parade ofwitnesses who had served in various capacities during the
expedition testified before a secret court of inquiry. Their testimony, taken
several years after the conclusion of the expedition, forms the major body of
this lengthy book dealing with matters that up to then had remained unanswered. Usually when the same detailed questions were asked of each of a
score of participants, they resulted in similar and often identical answers and
do not provide any narrative account of the expedition. Rather, the results of
the inquiry set forth the opinions of participants concerning specific aspects
of the expedition and its leadership, particularly those of mismanagement
and brutality by the commander-in-chief. Most of the witnesses seemed to be
moderate in their opinions concerning Vazquez de Coronado, and their "testimony" hardly placed him in an unjustifiable light. At worst he emerges as a
person who led the expedition but was not fully aware of many things that
transpired and that might have been of sufficient import, if he were to be
found guilty, to result in incarceration or a heavy fine. In the latter case a fine
would have been cruel but not unusual punishment since Vazquez de Coronado had already lost about a million dollars of his own (or of his wife's) resources. That Vazquez was a favorite of New Spain's viceroy, AntQnio de
Mendoza, who also had been heavily invested in the failed expedition, perhaps had some considerable bearing on the outcome of the secret trial.
The introductions to each chapter and, to some extent, the accompanying
footnotes can be classified as neo-Black Legend literature, with the minor exception that Flint occasionally assigns some humanity to the Spaniards. The
sixteenth-century Indians (usually called Native Americans) are never shown
to have been aggressors, misguided, devious, or even just plain wrong. This
approach reduces the author's writing to a matter of just how black to make the
new Black Legend. One considerably long comment concerns the Spanish use
of "Dogs of the Conquest," which are noted to have played havoc in terrifying
the Indians. This was later a matter of concern in the investigation carried out
long after the fact. For the invaders to have brought with them trained war dogs,
an integral part of Spanish weaponry, and not to have used them when necessary would have been strange indeed. That in New Mexico the dogs proved
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again to be a successful attack corps justified including them, and to have not
used them would have doubtless brought at least a reprimand.
From its beginning the expedition of Francisco Vazquez de Coronado
had been organized with great expectations of new discoveries that might exceed those of Hernan Cortes in the heart of the Aztec empire and those of
Francisco Pizarro among the Incas of South America. At first there seemed
to be a reasonable possibility of success based on the reports of Alvar Nunez
Cabeza de Vaca and the French Franciscan Marcos de Niza, both of whom
had previously entered the general area. While wandering through the fringes
of the zone later explored by Coronado, the former had heard vague rumors
of advanced Indian civilization, always distant and in the wrong direction as
regards his efforts to return to areas of Spanish control. On the other hand,
Fray Marcos brought back from a scouting exploration his own "visual" report of evidence of high culture, although his credibility was soon doubted
as his account proved greatly exaggerated, a polite term for outright lying.
When Vazquez de Coronado entered the target area and found only disappointment, he gradually expanded the scope of his exploration. Like most
lengthy explorations, no matter how well prepared logistically, this one also
suffered from "the shorts," the high-handed relief of which resulted in converting the early Indian welcome to an attitude of hostility and a desire to see
the now unwelcome guests depart. Grasping for straws based on oral reports
from dubious sources, Vazquez and his party set out to the east from the Rfo
Grande Pueblos, across the upper Pecos, over the Llano Estacado, and onto
the immense Buffalo Plains in a fruitless search for the riches ofGran Quivira.
When this quest failed to yield anticipated results, the party continued to lose
enthusiasm. Only a small contingent of Franciscans who had come on a different mission remained bouyant. The upshot was that of a crestfallen group
of Spanish conquistadores returning to Nueva Galicia by following in reverse
order the route taken earlier with great anticipation.
An investigation concerning the conduct and results of an expedition
was almost inevitable on the heels of any highly expensive and very disappointing major effort such as that led by Vasquez de Coronado. As the
secret trial turned out, the leader was exonerated. Enough evidence was
presented so that the second-in-command, Garcfa Lopez de Cardenas, was
found guilty of brutality; he was the only member to be punished for the
excesses committed by the group. Even so, his eventual punishment "was
largely symbolic, both the fine and service requirement having been drastically tempered" (p. 339)'
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This substantial volume, together with its enticing title, seems to promise
much new information and as a result possibly lead to a revision of what has
been heretofore common knowledge concerning one of the great explorers
and his lengthy expedition. Unfortunately, the new information contained
in this book is disproportionate to its bulk. The methodology utilized in presenting the information is in large measure responsible for this shortcoming.
This reviewer estimates that the volume could be reduced by over 35 percent
almost without any loss, but to do so would have required even greater effort
by Flint. Elimination of repetitious questions, especially those having the
identical answers by several witnesses, would have reduced the volume of
print appreciably but would have required more writing and much less translating by the author. Needless to say, converting all the documents to paleographic form adds considerable bulk. The decision to translate everything
despite repetitiousness is perhaps admissible. However, including an occasional photographic reproduction of a page of the original documentation
might have sufficed, thereby eliminating the long paleographic sections. With
the exception of a few dozen scholars, almost no readers will profit by the
existing and time-consuming tour de force, but it does give opportunity to
those who want to check the author-translator's merit. For example, when
referring to the commanding officer's personnel, to translate the Spanish
word criados as "henchmen" is either to convey purposely or accidentally the
impression that V<'isquez de Coronado had under his personal direction an
unscrupulous group of followers. In my dictionaries I find servant, menial,
and groom as proper renderings for criados. In my entire life I have never
thought of equating the two words, and I find Flint's repeated use of the term
"henchmen" for servants a reflection of gratuitous and unwarranted bias.
In summary, a very worthwhile contribution could have been made by
taking the time to convert this abundant but redundant material into a brief
book or a couple ofuseful articles. By so doing, author Flint would have gained
the appreciation of New Mexico history devotees, especially those not capable of wading through over two hundred pages of paleographic text, which
in turn Flint has converted into that number of translated pages more or less.

